APPENDIX A

Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Service

Fire and Rescue Service

Treasury Management Strategy Statement

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy

2017/18

1. <u>Introduction</u>

1.1 **Background**

The Authority is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Authority's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Authority's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Authority, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Authority can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Authority risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

'The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.'

1.2 **Statutory Requirements**

The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Authority to 'have regard to' the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Authority's capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

The Act therefore requires the Authority to set out its treasury strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy (as required by Investment Guidance subsequent to the Act and included as paragraph 9 of this report); this sets out the Authority's policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the security and liquidity of those investments.

The Department of Communities and Local Government has issued revised investment guidance which came into effect from 1 April 2010. There were no major changes required over and above the changes already required by the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice 2011.

1.3 **CIPFA Requirements**

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised November 2011) was adopted by this Authority on 1 April 2004.

The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

1. Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Authority's treasury management activities.
2. Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Authority will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
3. Receipt by the Fire and Rescue Authority (FRA) of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement - including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy - for the year ahead, a Mid-year Review Report and an Annual Report covering activities during the previous year.
4. Delegation by the Authority of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
5. Delegation by the Authority of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Authority the FRA has delegated this to the Corporate Services Policy and Challenge Group.

1.4 **Treasury Management Strategy for 2017/18**

The suggested strategy for 2017/18 in respect of the following aspects of the treasury management function, is based upon the Treasury Officer's views on interest rates, supplemented with leading market forecasts provided by the Authority's treasury adviser, Capita Asset Services and in liaison with the Head of Finance and Treasurer.

The strategy covers:

- treasury limits in force which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Authority
- Prudential and Treasury Indicators
- the current treasury position
- the borrowing requirement
- prospects for interest rates
- the borrowing strategy

- policy on borrowing in advance of need
- debt rescheduling
- the investment strategy
- creditworthiness policy
- policy on use of external service providers
- the Minimum Revenue Position strategy

1.5 **Balanced Budget Requirement**

It is a statutory requirement under Section 33 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, for the Authority to produce a balanced budget. In particular, Section 32 requires a local authority to calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This, therefore, means that increases in capital expenditure must be limited to a level whereby increases in charges to revenue from the following can be met:

1. increases in interest charges caused by increased borrowing to finance additional capital expenditure, and
2. any increases in running costs from new capital projects are limited to a level which is affordable within the projected income of the Authority for the foreseeable future.

2. Treasury Limits for 2017/18 to 2018/19

It is a statutory duty under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations, for the Authority to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is termed the ‘Affordable Borrowing Limit’. In England and Wales the Authorised Limit represents the legislative limit specified in the Act.

The Authority must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the Authorised Limit, which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital investment remains within sustainable limits and, in particular, that the impact upon its future council tax level is ‘acceptable’.

Whilst termed an 'Affordable Borrowing Limit', the capital plans to be considered for inclusion incorporate financing by both external borrowing and other forms of liability. The Authorised Limit is to be set, on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years; details of the Authorised Limit can be found in Appendix 3 of this report.

3. **Current Portfolio Position**

The Authority's treasury portfolio position at 31 December 2016 comprised:

		Principal	Average Rate
		£'000	
Fixed rate borrowing	Public Works Loan Board (PWLB)	10,087	4.19%
Variable rate borrowing		-	
Other long-term liabilities		132	
Gross Debt		10,219	
Total Investments		13,996	
Net Debt/(Surplus)		**(3,777)**	

4. **Borrowing Requirement**

The Authority's borrowing requirement is as follows:

	2016/17	**2017/18**	**2018/19**	**2019/20**	**2020/21**
	£'000 Estimate	**£'000 Estimate**	**£'000 Estimate**	**£'000 Estimate**	**£'000 Estimate**
New borrowing	0	0	0	0	0
Alternative financing arrangements	1274	1278	1656	1533	1300
Replacement borrowing	0	0	0	0	0
Total CFR (Borrowing Requirement)	**1274**	**1278**	**1656**	**1533**	**1300**

5. **Prudential and Treasury Indicators for 2017/18 – 2020/21**

Prudential and Treasury Indicators (as set out in table in Appendix 3 to this report) are relevant for the purposes of setting an integrated treasury management strategy. These are regularly reported to the FRA in the Treasury Reports.

The Authority is also required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The original 2001 Code was adopted on 1 April 2004, and the revisions for the 2009 Code were adopted in April 2011. The revised 2011 Code was adopted by the FRA in February 2012 by approving this and accompanying reports.

6. **Prospects for Interest Rates**

The Authority has appointed Capita Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Authority to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives our central view.

	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20
Bank rate	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%
5yr PWLB rate	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.00%
10yr PWLB rate	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%
25yr PWLB rate	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%
50yr PWLB rate	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%

The Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25% on 4th August in order to counteract what it forecast was going to be a sharp slowdown in growth in the second half of 2016. It also gave a strong steer that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again by the end of the year. However, economic data since August has indicated much stronger growth in the second half 2016 than that forecast; also, inflation forecasts have risen substantially as a result of a continuation of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since early August. Consequently, Bank Rate was not cut again in November or December and, on current trends, it now appears unlikely that there will be another cut, although that cannot be completely ruled out if there was a significant dip downwards in economic growth. During the two-year period 2017 – 2019, when the UK is negotiating the terms for withdrawal from the EU, it is likely that the MPC will do nothing to dampen growth prospects, (ie by raising Bank Rate), which will already be adversely impacted by the uncertainties of what form Brexit will eventually take. Accordingly, a first increase to 0.50% is not tentatively pencilled in, as in the table above, until quarter 2 2019, after those negotiations have been concluded, (though the period for negotiations could be extended). However, if strong domestically generated inflation, (eg from wage increases within the UK), were to emerge, then the pace and timing of increases in Bank Rate could be brought forward.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected that at some point, there would be a start to a switch back from bonds to equities after a historic long term trend over about the last twenty five years of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial quantitative easing purchases of bonds, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising prices of bonds. The opposite side of this coin has been a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election, has called into question whether, or when, this trend has, or may, reverse, especially when America is likely to lead the way in reversing monetary policy. Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as strong economic growth becomes more firmly established. The expected substantial rise in the Fed. rate over the next few years may make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US would be likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in other developed countries but the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong, or weak, the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress in the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

PWLB rates and gilt yields have been experiencing exceptional levels of volatility that have been highly correlated to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. It is likely that these exceptional levels of volatility could continue to occur for the foreseeable future.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is to the downside, particularly in view of the current uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit and the timetable for its implementation.

Apart from the above uncertainties, **downside risks to current forecasts** for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Monetary policy action by the central banks of major economies reaching its limit of effectiveness and failing to stimulate significant sustainable growth, combat the threat of deflation and reduce high levels of debt in some countries, combined with a lack of adequate action from national governments to promote growth through structural reforms, fiscal policy and investment expenditure.

- Major national polls:
  - Italian constitutional referendum 4.12.16 resulted in a ‘No’ vote which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Renzi. This means that Italy needs to appoint a new government.
  - Spain has a minority government with only 137 seats out of 350 after already having had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016. This is potentially highly unstable.
  - Dutch general election 15.3.17;
  - French presidential election April/May 2017;
  - French National Assembly election June 2017;
  - German Federal election August – October 2017.

- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with Greece being a particular problem, and stress arising from disagreement between EU countries on free movement of people and how to handle a huge influx of immigrants and terrorist threats.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks, especially Italian.
- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, causing a significant increase in safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK’s main trading partners - the EU and US.

The potential for **upside risks to current forecasts** for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates, include:

- UK inflation rising to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and in the US, causing an increase in the inflation premium in gilt yields.
- A rise in US Treasury yields as a result of Fed. funds rate increases and rising inflation expectations in the USA, dragging UK gilt yields upwards.
- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- A downward revision to the UK’s sovereign credit rating undermining investor confidence in holding sovereign debt (gilts).

Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2017/18 and beyond;
- Borrowing interest rates have been on a generally downward trend during most of 2016 up to mid-August; they fell sharply to historically phenomenally low levels after the referendum and then even further after the MPC meeting of 4 August when a new package of quantitative easing purchasing of gilts was announced. Gilt yields have since risen sharply due to a rise in concerns around a 'hard Brexit', the fall in the value of sterling, and an increase in inflation expectations. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

7. Borrowing Strategy

7.1 Borrowing Rates

The Capita Asset forecast for the PWLB new borrowing rate is as follows:

	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sept-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Mar-19	Mar-20
Bank rate	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.75%
5yr PWLB rate	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	2.00%
10yr PWLB rate	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.50%	2.70%
25yr PWLB rate	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.20%	3.40%
50yr PWLB rate	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	3.00%	3.20%

A more detailed Capita Asset forecast is included in Appendix 2.

The Authority is currently maintaining an over-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has been exceeded by loan debt and leasing liabilities. The strategy for the CFR and the under/over borrowed position going forward will be discussed at the next meeting with our Treasury advisors.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2017/18 treasury operations. The Head of Finance and Treasurer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances.

Sensitivity of the forecast – In normal circumstances the main sensitivities of the forecast are likely to be the two scenarios noted below. The Authority officers, in conjunction with the treasury advisers, will continually monitor both the prevailing interest rates and the market forecasts, adopting the following responses to a change of sentiment:

- *If it were felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates,* eg due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation, then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.

- *If it were felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast,* perhaps arising from a greater than expected increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised with the likely action that fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates were still relatively cheap.

7.2 **External v Internal Borrowing**

The table below shows the PWLB debt of £10,087,000. This is made of up three loans. Two were taken out in 2006 and 2008 to fund the Capital programme for those years. These are both fixed rate loans over a period of 50 years. The third loan was taken out during 2012 to fund a Capital purchase during that year. This third loan is a fixed rate loan over 4 years and 6 months and is due for repayment in March 2017.

Cash balances are made up of cash in the bank and Investments. We currently have five investments totalling a value of £7,000,000 however by 31 March 2017, one investment will have matured but will be re-invested.

Current Portfolio Position

- This Authority's treasury portfolio as at 31 March 2015, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external borrowing (the treasury management operations), against the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement – CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£m	2015/16 Actual	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
External Debt						
Debt at 1 April	10,087	10,087	9,987	9,987	9,987	9,987
Expected change in Debt		(100)				
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	209	132	70	6	0	0
Expected change in OLTL	0	0	0	0	0	0
Actual debt at 31 March	**10,296**	**10,119**	**10,057**	**9,993**	**9,987**	**9,987**
The Capital Financing Requirement	**9,900**	**8,876**	**8,383**	**7,892**	**7,464**	**7050**
Under / (over) borrowing	**(396)**	**(1,243)**	**(1,674)**	**(2,101)**	**(2,523)**	**(2,937)**
Total investments at 31 March						
Investments	**13,915**	**10,000**	**10,000**	**10,000**	**9,000**	**8,000**
Investment change	0	(3,915)	0	0	(1,000)	(1,000)
Net Debt	**3,619**	**(119)**	**(57)**	**13**	**(987)**	**(1,987)**

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Authority operates its activities within well defined limits. One of these is that the Authority needs to ensure that its total borrowing (net of any investments) does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2016/17 and the following two financial years'. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

The Head of Finance and Treasurer reports that the Authority complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future years. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report. The above position will be closely monitored and has been discussed with our Treasury Advisors.

Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

The Operational Boundary: This is the limit beyond which external borrowing is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual borrowing.

Operational boundary £m	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Borrowing	10,087	9,987	9,987	9,987
Other long term liabilities	132	70	6	0
Overdraft	0	0	0	0
Total	10,219	10,057	9,993	9,987

The Authorised Limit for external borrowing. A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external borrowing is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Authority. It reflects the level of external borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all Local Authorities plans, or those of a specific Authority, although this power has not yet been exercised.

2. The FRA is asked to approve the following Authorised Limit:

Authorised limit £m	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Borrowing	10,087	9,987	9,987	9,987
Other long term liabilities	132	70	6	0
Overdraft	0	0	0	0
Worst Case Scenario Payroll	1,900	1,900	1,900	1,900
Total	12,119	11,957	11,893	11,887

7.3 **Policy on Borrowing in Advance of Need**

The Authority will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Authority can ensure the security of such funds.

In determining whether borrowing will be undertaken in advance of need the Authority will:

- ensure that there is a clear link between the capital programme and maturity profile of the existing debt portfolio which supports the need to take funding in advance of need;
- ensure the ongoing revenue liabilities created, and the implications for the future plans and budgets have been considered;
- evaluate the economic and market factors that might influence the manner and timing of any decision to borrow;
- consider the merits and demerits of alternative forms of funding;
- consider the alternative interest rate bases available, the most appropriate periods to fund and repayment profiles to use;
- consider the impact of borrowing in advance on temporarily (until required to finance capital expenditure) increasing investment cash balances and the consequent increase in exposure to counterparty risk, and other risks, and the level of such risks given the controls in place to minimise them.

8. **Debt Rescheduling**

The introduction by the PWLB in 2007 of a spread between the rates applied to new borrowing and repayment of debt, which has now been compounded since 20 October 2010 by a considerable further widening of the difference between new borrowing and repayment rates, has meant that PWLB to PWLB debt restructuring is now much less attractive than it was before both of these events. In particular, consideration would have to be given to the large premiums which would be incurred by prematurely repaying existing PWLB loans and it is very unlikely that these could be justified on value for money grounds, if using replacement PWLB refinancing. However, some interest savings might still be achievable through using LOBO (Lenders Option Borrowers Option) loans, and other market loans, in rescheduling exercises rather than using PWLB borrowing as the source of replacement financing.

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term rates, there may be potential for some residual opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the size of premiums incurred, their short term nature, and the likely cost of refinancing those short term loans, once they mature, compared to the current rates of longer term debt in the existing debt portfolio. Any such rescheduling and repayment of debt is likely to cause a flattening of the Authority's maturity profile as in recent years there has been a skew towards longer dated PWLB loans.

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the strategy outlined in paragraph 7 above;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential left for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the FRA at the earliest meeting following its action.

9. **<u>Annual Investment Strategy</u>**

9.1 **Investment Policy**

The Authority will have regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ('the Guidance') and the 2011 revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ('the CIPFA TM Code'). The Authority's investment priorities are:

a. the security of capital, and
b. the liquidity of its investments.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Authority applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk.

Continuing regulatory changes in the banking sector are designed to see greater stability, lower risk and the removal of expectations of Government financial support should an institution fail. This withdrawal of implied sovereign support is anticipated to have an effect on ratings applied to institutions. This will result in the key ratings used to monitor counterparties being the Short Term and Long Term ratings only. Viability, Financial Strength and Support Ratings previously applied will effectively become redundant. This change does not reflect deterioration in the credit environment but rather a change of method in response to regulatory changes.

As with previous practice, ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as 'credit default swaps' and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

The aim of the strategy is to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which will also enable divesification and thus avoidance of concentration risk.

The intention of the strategy is to provide security of investment and minimisation of risk.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendix 5 under the 'Specified' and 'Non-Specified' Investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Authority's Treasury Management Practices – Schedules.

Money Market Funds for short-term investments will be considered.

9.2 Creditworthiness Policy

This Authority applies the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS (Credit Default Swap) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Authority to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Authority will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No Colour not to be used for Investments

Our creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Authority use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored six monthly. The Authority is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita Asset creditworthiness service.

- If a downgrade results in the counterparty/investment scheme no longer meeting the Authority's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- In addition to the use of Credit Ratings the Authority will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Authority's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Authority will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that government support.

Nat West Bank (part of the RBS group) does not currently meet our "fixed term investment" criteria as it has a rating of F2 (Fitch ratings), however the Authority will continue to use it for cash flow management purposes for "day to day" banking needs but will not place any fixed term investments until it meets the criteria set out in the Authority's Treasury Management Policies and Practises.

9.3 Country Limits

The Authority has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of *AA-* from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide) or UK banks who meet the Capita Asset Services credit criteria. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.

9.4 Investment Strategy

In-house funds:

Investments will be made for terms of up to 364 days. The Authority will consider its cash flow requirements, prevailing market conditions and advice from its Treasury Advisers when determining exact terms for each investment, in order to ensure that it is both favourable and prudent. At the time of writing, interest rates are at a low point but are expected to rise further over the next few years.

Investment returns expectations: Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.25% until quarter 2 2019 and not to rise above 0.75% by quarter 1 2020. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

2016/2017	0.25%
2017/2018	0.25%
2018/2019	0.25%
2019/2020	0.50%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:

2016/17	0.25%
2017/18	0.25%
2018/19	0.25%
2019/20	0.50%
2020/21	0.75%
2021/22	1.00%
2022/23	1.50%
2023/24	1.75%
Later years	2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently probably slightly skewed to the downside in view of the uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit. If growth expectations disappoint and inflationary pressures are minimal, the start of increases in Bank Rate could be pushed back. On the other hand, should the pace of growth quicken and/or forecasts for increases in inflation rise, there could be an upside risk, ie Bank Rate increases occur earlier and/or at a quicker pace

9.5 **End of Year Investment Report**

At the end of the financial year, the Authority will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

9.6 **Policy on the Use of External Service Providers**

The Authority uses Capita Asset as its external treasury management advisers.

The Authority recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Authority will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

9.7 **Scheme of Delegation**

Please see Appendix 6.

9.8 **Role of the Section 151 Officer**

Please see Appendix 7.

Appendices

1. MRP Strategy
2. Interest Rate Forecasts
3. Prudential and Treasury Indicators
4. Economic Background
5. Specified and Non-Specified Investments
6. Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation
7. The Treasury Management Role of the Section 151 Officer

APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM REVENUE PROVISION POLICY STATEMENT 2017/18

The Authority implemented the new Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) guidance in 2009/10 and will assess their MRP for 2017/18 in accordance with the main recommendations contained within the guidance issued by the Secretary of State under section 21(1A) of the Local Government Act 2003.

The major proportion of the MRP for 2017/18 will relate to the more historic debt liability that will continue to be charged at the rate of 4%, in accordance with option 1 of the guidance. Certain expenditure reflected within the debt liability at 31 March 2011 will under delegated powers be subject to MRP under option 3, which will be charged over a period which is reasonably commensurate with the estimated useful life applicable to the nature of expenditure, using the equal annual instalment method*)*. For example, capital expenditure on a new building, or on the refurbishment or enhancement of a building, will be related to the estimated life of that building.

Estimated life periods will be determined under delegated powers. To the extent that expenditure is not on the creation of an asset and is of a type that is subject to estimated life periods that are referred to in the guidance, these periods will generally be adopted by the Authority. However, the Authority reserves the right to determine useful life periods and prudent MRP in exceptional circumstances where the recommendations of the guidance would not be appropriate.

As some types of capital expenditure incurred by the Authority are not capable of being related to an individual asset, asset lives will be assessed on a basis which most reasonably reflects the anticipated period of benefit that arises from the expenditure. Also, whatever type of expenditure is involved, it will be grouped together in a manner which reflects the nature of the main component of expenditure and will only be divided up in cases where there are two or more major components with substantially different useful economic lives.

APPENDIX 2

INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

1. Individual Forecasts

Capital Asset Services

Interest rate forecast – February 2017

	Now	Mar 17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18
Bank Rate	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%
5yr PWLB rate	1.38%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%
10yr PWLB rate	2.11%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%
25yr PWLB rate	2.78%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%
50yr PWLB rate	2.54%	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%

Capital Economics

Interest rate forecast – January 2017

	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19
Bank Rate	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%
5yr PWLB rate	1.40%	1.60%	1.80%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%
10yr PWLB rate	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.55%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%
25yr PWLB rate	2.75%	2.90%	3.05%	3.15%	3.25%	3.25%	3.35%	3.45%
50yr PWLB rate	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%

APPENDIX 3

PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS

Prudential & Treasury Indicators	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
Affordability Indicators				
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream	2.61%	2.68%	2.63%	2.54%
Estimated incremental impact of capital investment decisions on Band D Council Tax	£0.00	£0.00	£0.00	£0.00
Capital Expenditure Indicators	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**	**£000**
Capital Financing Requirement	8,877	8,383	7,892	7,465
External Debt Indicators				
Authorised Limit for External Debt				
Borrowing	11,987	11,887	11,887	11,887
Other long-term liabilities	132	70	6	0
Total	12,119	11,957	11,893	11,887
Operational Boundary for External Debt				
Borrowing	10,087	9,987	9,987	9,987
Other long-term liabilities	132	70	6	0
Total	10,219	10,057	9,993	9,987
Treasury Management Indicators				
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure	291	312	312	312
Upper limit for variable interest rate exposure	97	104	104	104
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over				

Prudential & Treasury Indicators	**2016/17**	**2017/18**	**2018/19**	**2019/20**
364 days (per maturity date)	0	0	0	0
Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing during 2017/18:	**Upper Limit**		**Lower Limit**	
Under 12 months	0%		0%	
12 months and within 24 months	0%		0%	
24 months and within 5 years	0%		0%	
5 years and within 10 years	0%		0%	
10 years and above	100%		100%	

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

UK - GDP growth rates in 2013, 2014 and 2015 of 2.2%, 2.9% and 1.8% were some of the strongest rates among the G7 countries. Growth is expected to have strengthened in 2016 with the first three quarters coming in respectively at +0.4%, +0.7% and +0.5%. The latest Bank of England forecast for growth in 2016 as a whole is +2.2%. The figure for quarter 3 was a pleasant surprise which confounded the downbeat forecast by the Bank of England in August of only +0.1%, (subsequently revised up in September, but only to +0.2%). During most of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the economy had faced headwinds for exporters from the appreciation of sterling against the Euro, and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, and from the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme.

The **referendum vote for Brexit** in June 2016 delivered an immediate shock fall in confidence indicators and business surveys at the beginning of August, which were interpreted by the Bank of England in its August Inflation Report as pointing to an impending sharp slowdown in the economy. However, the following monthly surveys in September showed an equally sharp recovery in confidence and business surveys so that it is generally expected that the economy will post reasonably strong growth numbers through the second half of 2016 and also in 2017, albeit at a slower pace than in the first half of 2016.

The **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 4th August** was therefore dominated by countering this expected sharp slowdown and resulted in a package of measures that included a cut in Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, a renewal of quantitative easing, with £70bn made available for purchases of gilts and corporate bonds, and a £100bn tranche of cheap borrowing being made available for banks to use to lend to businesses and individuals.

The **MPC meeting of 3 November** left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.25% and other monetary policy measures also remained unchanged. This was in line with market expectations, but a major change from the previous quarterly Inflation Report MPC meeting of 4 August, which had given a strong steer, in its forward guidance, that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again, probably by the end of the year if economic data turned out as forecast by the Bank. The MPC meeting of 15 December also left Bank Rate and other measures unchanged.

The latest MPC decision included a forward view that **Bank Rate** could go either up or down depending on how economic data evolves in the coming months. Our central view remains that Bank Rate will remain unchanged at 0.25% until the first increase to 0.50% in quarter 2 2019 (unchanged from our previous forecast). However, we would not, as yet, discount the risk of a cut in Bank Rate if economic growth were to take a significant dip downwards, though we think this is unlikely. We would also point out that forecasting as far ahead as mid 2019 is highly fraught as there are many potential economic headwinds which could blow the UK economy one way or the other as well as political developments in the UK, (especially over the terms of Brexit), EU, US and beyond, which could have a major impact on our forecasts.

The pace of Bank Rate increases in our forecasts has been slightly increased beyond the three year time horizon to reflect higher inflation expectations.

The August quarterly Inflation Report was based on a pessimistic forecast of near to zero GDP growth in quarter 3, ie a sharp slowdown in growth from +0.7% in quarter 2, in reaction to the shock of the result of the referendum in June. However, **consumers** have very much stayed in a 'business as usual' mode and there has been no sharp downturn in spending; it is consumer expenditure that underpins the services sector which comprises about 75% of UK GDP. After a fairly flat three months leading up to October, retail sales in October surged at the strongest rate since September 2015 and were again strong in November. In addition, the GfK consumer confidence index recovered quite strongly to -3 in October after an initial sharp plunge in July to -12 in reaction to the referendum result. However, in November it fell to -8 indicating a return to pessimism about future prospects among consumers, probably based mainly around concerns about rising inflation eroding purchasing power.

Bank of England GDP forecasts in the November quarterly Inflation Report were as follows, (August forecasts in brackets) - 2016 +2.2%, (+2.0%); 2017 1.4%, (+0.8%); 2018 +1.5%, (+1.8%). There has, therefore, been a sharp increase in the forecast for 2017, a marginal increase in 2016 and a small decline in growth, now being delayed until 2018, as a result of the impact of Brexit.

Capital Economics' GDP forecasts are as follows: 2016 +2.0%; 2017 +1.5%; 2018 +2.5%. They feel that pessimism is still being overdone by the Bank and Brexit will not have as big an effect as initially feared by some commentators.

The Chancellor has said he will do 'whatever is needed', ie to **promote growth**; there are two main options he can follow – fiscal policy, eg cut taxes, increase investment allowances for businesses, and/or increase government expenditure on infrastructure, housing etc. This will mean that the PSBR deficit elimination timetable will need to slip further into the future as promoting growth, (and ultimately boosting tax revenues in the longer term), will be a more urgent priority. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, had warned that a vote for Brexit would be likely to cause a slowing in growth, particularly from a reduction in business investment, due to the uncertainty of whether the UK would have continuing full access, (ie without tariffs), to the EU single market. He also warned that the Bank could not do all the heavy lifting to boost economic growth and suggested that the Government would need to help growth, eg by increasing investment expenditure and by using fiscal policy tools. The newly appointed Chancellor, Phillip Hammond, announced, in the aftermath of the referendum result and the formation of a new Conservative cabinet, that the target of achieving a budget surplus in 2020 would be eased in the Autumn Statement on 23 November. This was duly confirmed in the Statement which also included some increases in infrastructure spending.

The other key factor in forecasts for Bank Rate is **inflation** where the MPC aims for a target for CPI of 2.0%. The November Inflation Report included an increase in the peak forecast for inflation from 2.3% to 2.7% during 2017; (Capital Economics are forecasting a peak of just under 3% in 2018). This increase was largely due to the effect of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since the referendum, although during November, sterling has recovered some of this fall to end up 15% down against the dollar, and 8% down against the euro (as at the MPC meeting date – 15.12.16).This depreciation will feed through into a sharp increase in the cost of imports and materials used in production in the UK. However, the MPC is expected to look through the acceleration in inflation caused by external, (outside of the UK), influences, although it has given a clear warning that if wage inflation were to rise significantly as a result of these cost pressures on consumers, then they would take action to raise Bank Rate.

What is clear is that **consumer disposable income** will come under pressure, as the latest employers' survey is forecasting median pay rises for the year ahead of only 1.1% at a time when inflation will be rising significantly higher than this. The CPI figure has been on an upward trend in 2016 and reached 1.2% in November. However, prices paid by factories for inputs rose to 13.2% though producer output prices were still lagging behind at 2.3% and core inflation was 1.4%, confirming the likely future upwards path.

Gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, have risen sharply since hitting a low point in mid-August. There has also been huge volatility during 2016 as a whole. The year started with 10 year gilt yields at 1.88%, fell to a low point of 0.53% on 12 August, and hit a new peak on the way up again of 1.55% on 15 November. The rebound since August reflects the initial combination of the yield-depressing effect of the MPC's new round of quantitative easing on 4 August, together with expectations of a sharp downturn in expectations for growth and inflation as per the pessimistic Bank of England Inflation Report forecast, followed by a sharp rise in growth expectations since August when subsequent business surveys, and GDP growth in quarter 3 at +0.5% q/q, confounded the pessimism. Inflation expectations also rose sharply as a result of the continuing fall in the value of sterling.

Employment had been growing steadily during 2016 but encountered a first fall in over a year, of 6,000, over the three months to October. The latest employment data in December, (for November), was distinctly weak with an increase in unemployment benefits claimants of 2,400 in November and of 13,300 in October. **House prices** have been rising during 2016 at a modest pace but the pace of increase has slowed since the referendum; a downturn in prices could dampen consumer confidence and expenditure.

<u>USA</u> - The American economy had a patchy 2015 with sharp swings in the quarterly **growth rate** leaving the overall growth for the year at 2.4%. Quarter 1 of 2016 at +0.8%, (on an annualised basis), and quarter 2 at 1.4% left average growth for the first half at a weak 1.1%. However, quarter 3 at 3.2% signalled a rebound to strong growth. The Fed embarked on its long anticipated first increase in rates at its December 2015 meeting. At that point, confidence was high that there would then be four more increases to come in 2016. Since then, more downbeat news on the international scene, and then the Brexit vote, have caused a delay in the timing of the second increase of 0.25% which came, as expected, in December 2016 to a range of 0.50% to 0.75%. Overall, despite some data setbacks, the US is still, probably, the best positioned of the major world economies to make solid progress towards a combination of strong growth, full employment and rising inflation: this is going to require the central bank to take action to raise rates so as to make progress towards normalisation of monetary policy, albeit at lower central rates than prevailed before the 2008 crisis. The Fed therefore also indicated that it expected three further increases of 0.25% in 2017 to deal with rising inflationary pressures.

The result of the **presidential election** in November is expected to lead to a strengthening of US growth if Trump's election promise of a major increase in expenditure on infrastructure is implemented. This policy is also likely to strengthen inflation pressures as the economy is already working at near full capacity. In addition, the unemployment rate is at a low point verging on what is normally classified as being full employment. However, the US does have a substantial amount of hidden unemployment in terms of an unusually large (for a developed economy), percentage of the working population not actively seeking employment.

Trump's election has had a profound effect on the **bond market and bond yields** rose sharply in the week after his election. Time will tell if this is a reasonable assessment of his election promises to cut taxes at the same time as boosting expenditure. This could lead to a sharp rise in total debt issuance from the current level of around 72% of GDP towards 100% during his term in office. However, although the Republicans now have a monopoly of power for the first time since the 1920s, in having a President and a majority in both Congress and the Senate, there is by no means any certainty that the politicians and advisers he has been appointing to his team, and both houses, will implement the more extreme policies that Trump outlined during his election campaign. Indeed, Trump may even rein back on some of those policies himself.

In the first week since the US election, there was a a major shift in **investor sentiment** away from bonds to equities, especially in the US. However, gilt yields in the UK and bond yields in the EU have also been dragged higher. Some commentators are saying that this rise has been an overreaction to the US election result which could be reversed. Other commentators take the view that this could well be the start of the long expected eventual unwinding of bond prices propelled upwards to unrealistically high levels, (and conversely bond yields pushed down), by the artificial and temporary power of quantitative easing.

<u>EZ</u> - In the Eurozone, **the ECB** commenced, in March 2015, its massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries at a rate of €60bn per month. This was intended to run initially to September 2016 but was extended to March 2017 at its December 2015 meeting. At its December and March 2016 meetings it progressively cut its deposit facility rate to reach -0.4% and its main refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero. At its March meeting, it also increased its monthly asset purchases to €80bn. These measures have struggled to make a significant impact in boosting economic growth and in helping inflation to rise significantly from low levels towards the target of 2%. Consequently, at its December meeting it extended its asset purchases programme by continuing purchases at the current monthly pace of €80 billion until the end of March 2017, but then continuing at a pace of €60 billion until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. It also stated that if, in the meantime, the outlook were to become less favourable or if financial conditions became inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment of the path of inflation, the Governing Council intended to increase the programme in terms of size and/or duration.

EZ GDP growth in the first three quarters of 2016 has been 0.5%, +0.3% and +0.3%, (+1.7% y/y). Forward indications are that economic growth in the EU is likely to continue at moderate levels. This has added to comments from many forecasters that those central banks in countries around the world which are currently struggling to combat low growth, are running out of ammunition to stimulate growth and to boost inflation. Central banks have also been stressing that national governments will need to do more by way of structural reforms, fiscal measures and direct investment expenditure to support demand and economic growth in their economies.

There are also significant specific political and other risks within the EZ:

- **Greece** continues to cause major stress in the EU due to its tardiness and reluctance in implementing key reforms required by the EU to make the country more efficient and to make significant progress towards the country being able to pay its way – and before the EU is prepared to agree to release further bail out funds.
- **Spain** has had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016, both of which failed to produce a workable government with a majority of the 350 seats. At the eleventh hour on 31 October, before it would have become compulsory to call a third general election, the party with the biggest bloc of seats (137), was given a majority confidence vote to form a government. This is potentially a highly unstable situation, particularly given the need to deal with an EU demand for implementation of a package of austerity cuts which will be highly unpopular.

- The under capitalisation of **Italian banks** poses a major risk. Some **German banks** are also undercapitalised, especially Deutsche Bank, which is under threat of major financial penalties from regulatory authorities that will further weaken its capitalisation. What is clear is that national governments are forbidden by EU rules from providing state aid to bail out those banks that are at risk, while, at the same time, those banks are unable realistically to borrow additional capital in financial markets due to their vulnerable financial state. However, they are also 'too big, and too important to their national economies, to be allowed to fail'.
- **4 December Italian constitutional referendum** on reforming the Senate and reducing its powers; this was also a confidence vote on Prime Minister Renzi who has resigned on losing the referendum. However, there has been remarkably little fall out from this result which probably indicates that the financial markets had already fully priced it in. A rejection of these proposals is likely to inhibit significant progress in the near future to fundamental political and economic reform which is urgently needed to deal with Italy's core problems, especially low growth and a very high debt to GDP ratio of 135%. These reforms were also intended to give Italy more stable government as no western European country has had such a multiplicity of governments since the Second World War as Italy, due to the equal split of power between the two chambers of the Parliament which are both voted in by the Italian electorate but by using different voting systems. It is currently unclear what the political, and other, repercussions are from this result.
- **Dutch general election 15.3.17**; a far right party is currently polling neck and neck with the incumbent ruling party. In addition, anti-big business and anti-EU activists have already collected two thirds of the 300,000 signatures required to force a referendum to be taken on approving the EU – Canada free trade pact. This could delay the pact until a referendum in 2018 which would require unanimous approval by all EU governments before it can be finalised. In April 2016, Dutch voters rejected by 61.1% an EU – Ukraine cooperation pact under the same referendum law. Dutch activists are concerned by the lack of democracy in the institutions of the EU.
- **French presidential election;** first round 13 April; second round 7 May 2017.
- **French National Assembly election June 2017.**
- **German Federal election August – 22 October 2017.** This could be affected by significant shifts in voter intentions as a result of terrorist attacks, dealing with a huge influx of immigrants and a rise in anti EU sentiment.
- The core EU, (note, not just the Eurozone currency area), principle of **free movement of people** within the EU is a growing issue leading to major stress and tension between EU states, especially with the Visegrad bloc of former communist states.

Given the number and type of challenges the EU faces in the next eighteen months, there is an identifiable risk for the EU project to be called into fundamental question. The risk of an electoral revolt against the EU establishment has gained traction after the shock results of the UK referendum and the US Presidential election. But it remains to be seen whether any shift in sentiment will gain sufficient traction to produce any further shocks within the EU.

<u>Asia</u> - Economic growth in **China** has been slowing down and this, in turn, has been denting economic growth in emerging market countries dependent on exporting raw materials to China. Medium term risks have been increasing in China, eg a dangerous build up in the level of credit compared to the size of GDP, plus there is a need to address a major over supply of housing and surplus industrial capacity, which both need to be eliminated. This needs to be combined with a rebalancing of the economy from investment expenditure to consumer spending. However, the central bank has a track record of supporting growth through various monetary policy measures, though these further stimulate the growth of credit risks and so increase the existing major imbalances within the economy.

Economic growth in **Japan** is still patchy, at best, and skirting with deflation, despite successive rounds of huge monetary stimulus and massive fiscal action to promote consumer spending. The Government is also making little progress on fundamental reforms of the economy.

<u>Emerging Countries</u> - There have been major concerns around the vulnerability of some emerging countries exposed to the downturn in demand for commodities from China or to competition from the increase in supply of American shale oil and gas reaching world markets. The ending of sanctions on Iran has also brought a further significant increase in oil supplies into the world markets. While these concerns have subsided during 2016, if interest rates in the USA do rise substantially over the next few years (and this could also be accompanied by a rise in the value of the dollar in exchange markets), this could cause significant problems for those emerging countries with large amounts of debt denominated in dollars. The Bank of International Settlements has recently released a report that $340bn of emerging market corporate debt will fall due for repayment in the final two months of 2016 and in 2017 – a 40% increase on the figure for the last three years.

Financial markets could also be vulnerable to risks from those emerging countries with major sovereign wealth funds, that are highly exposed to the falls in commodity prices from the levels prevailing before 2015, especially oil, and which, therefore, may have to liquidate substantial amounts of investments in order to cover national budget deficits over the next few years if the price of oil does not return to pre-2015 levels.

<u>Brexit Timetable and Process</u>

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. This period can be extended with the agreement of all members, ie not that likely.
- UK continues as an EU member during this two-year period with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK may also exit without any such agreements.

- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.
- It is possible that some sort of agreement could be reached for a transitional time period for actually implementing Brexit after March 2019 so as to help exporters to adjust in both the EU and in the UK.

SPECIFIED AND NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:

These are sterling investments that do not exceed 364 days and are with:

- an organisation that has a high credit rating;
- other local authority or,
- Central Government.

Strategy for specified Investments:

The Authority expects to have a net surplus of funds throughout 2017/18 and will invest those funds through the money market with those organisations included on its approved lending list (attached as Annex A).

The Authority's approved lending list includes the following organisations which are thus deemed to have a high credit rating:

- UK and Foreign Banks with a short-term rating of F1 or F1+ and a long-term rating of A- or higher.
- UK Building Societies with a short-term rating of F1 or F1+ and a long-term rating of A- or higher.

Ratings are those given by Fitch, the credit rating agency. In compiling the lending list, other factors such as legal rating and individual rating, which Fitch also provide, have been taken into consideration. The lending list is regularly reviewed to ensure that the organisations included maintain their credit ratings at the required level.

Investments will be made for terms of up to 364 days. The Authority will consider its cash flow requirements, prevailing market conditions and advice from its Treasury Advisers when determining exact terms for each investment, in order to ensure that it is both favourable and prudent. At the time of writing, interest rates are at a low point.

Non-Specified Investments:

These are any other investments that do not meet the criteria above for Specified Investments.

The Authority has no investments other than the short-term investment of surplus cash through the money market. Under previous regulations the investment of surplus cash was restricted to periods not exceeding 364 days. Under the new regulations that restriction is removed, however investments that do exceed 364 days are classified as non-specified investments because of the greater degree of risk they carry.

The Authority's cash flow profile makes it unlikely that investments in excess of 364 days would be considered and consequently no non-specified investments are anticipated.

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: (All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year,** meeting the minimum 'high' rating criteria where applicable)

	Minimum 'High' Credit Criteria	**Use**
Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	--	In-house
Term deposits – local authorities	--	In-house
Term deposits – banks and building societies **	Green	In-house

Approved countries for investments

Based on lowest available rating

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar
- UK

AA-

- Belgium

Term deposits with nationalised banks and banks and building societies

	Minimum Credit Criteria	Use	Max % Limit	Max Maturity Period
UK banks	Orange	In-house	25%	**1 year**
UK banks and Building Societies	Red	In-house	25%	**6 months**
UK banks and Building Societies	Green	In-house	25%	**100 days**
UK banks and Building Societies	No Colour	In-house	Not to be used	
UK part nationalised banks	Blue	In-house	90%	**1 year**
DMADF	AAA	In-house	Unlimited	**6 months**
Local Authorities	n/a	In-house	25%	**5 years**
Money Market Funds	MMF rating	In-house and Fund Managers		**1 year**
Enhanced Money Market Funds with a credit score of 1.25	MMF/bond fund rating	In-house and Fund Managers		**1 year**
Enhanced Money Market Funds with a credit score of 1.5	MMF/bond fund rating	In-house and Fund Managers		**1 year**
Non-UK Banks	Orange	In-house and Fund Managers	50%	**1 year**

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Authority. To ensure that the Authority is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

APPENDIX 6

TREASURY MANAGEMENT SCHEME OF DELEGATION

i. **FRA**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities (via the Corporate Services Policy and Challenge Group);
- approval of annual strategy;
- budget consideration and approval.

ii. **Corporate Services Policy and Challenge Group**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment;
- the review and challenge function of Treasury Management as delegated by the FRA.

iii. **Head of Finance and Treasurer**

- reviewing the treasury management strategy, policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

APPENDIX 7

THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 151 OFFICER

The S151 (Responsible) Officer:

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.